Introduction
In the past decade and a half, the leaders of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have presided over the rapid transformation of their country-seen primarily as a threat during the Cold War-to a proactive and confident member of the international community today. In the early nineties, China embarked on a strategy of rapprochement diplomacy with its neighbors, establishing or re-establishing diplomatic relations, opening negotiations on its contiguous border disputes such as the 1991 Sino-Russian border agreement, and signing accords like the 1994 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Mongolia. Additionally, Beijing's leaders began to reach out to multilateral forums. For instance, China became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1991, a dialogue partner of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 1994, and in 1996 was a founding member of the Asia-Europe Meeting and established the Shanghai Five, a precursor to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Although China's relations with Asia warmed considerably in the early nineties, Beijing's willingness to use force to pursue territorial objectives exacerbated concern over a growing "China Threat," particularly in Southeast Asia. This willingness was evidenced in the case of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1995 and also against Taiwan in the Strait Crisis of 1995 and 1996. In response, China's leaders redoubled their efforts to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful rise. Just such an opportunity arose when Beijing refused to devalue its currency but offered monetary assistance and infrastructure deals to countries hit hard in the Asian financial crisis.
That year, 1997, was a watershed for the launch of China's "charm offensive" with Southeast Asia 1 -a combination of diplomatic, economic, and cultural initiatives at both bilateral and multilateral levels. The same year, China joined with ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea to begin the ASEAN ϩ 3 meetings aimed at increasing multilateral cooperation between Northeast and Southeast Asia. Overall, via steps ranging from launching the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, acceding to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and signing the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to an increase in student exchanges and tourism and construction of major projects such as the North Railway in the Philippines and the Surabaya Bridge in Indonesia, Chinese and Southeast Asian relations have improved dramatically over the past decade.
Beijing's strategy in Southeast Asia-increased high-level visits, educational and cultural exchanges, generous no-strings-attached aid packages, public works projects, and investments in resource industries and critical infrastructurehas become part of a broader trend of Chinese activism in many regions of the world. From Latin America and Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia, the world has witnessed an upsurge in Chinese activities over the past five years as part of Beijing's efforts to pursue a wide range of political, economic, and strategic objectives. visits by senior Chinese officials to countries around the world as well as multibillion-dollar oil and gas agreements with Saudi Arabia and Iran, a liquid natural gas contract with Australia valued at almost $18 billion, 3 a pledge to invest $100 billion in South America over the next 10 years, the financing of a $1 million scholarship fund in Grenada and a $500 million investment in Cuba's nickel industry. Beijing has launched the first Chinese overseas radio station in Kenya and invested in hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
China's burgeoning influence extends even to the South Pacific. Although many observers consider the South Pacific backward and remote, China's relations with the region have nonetheless developed rapidly since the late 1990s. Of the 14 nations that make up the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (excluding Australia and New Zealand), 4 the eight that recognize the PRC (the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Niue, 5 Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu) have seen their diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China intensify-with an increasing number of official visits and various financial assistance packages aimed at enhancing trade, building infrastructure, equipping government and military assets, and developing natural resources. This rising Chinese involvement in the South Pacific also comes at a time when the U.S. and European allies are decreasing aid and scaling back their presence. Australia and New Zealand, which regard themselves as having a 3. Note: All dollar figures in this paper are in U.S. dollars. 4. The PIF is a regional organization for the independent countries of the South Pacific, comprising member states Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The Forum's website is at Ͻ http://www. forumsec. org.fj/ Ͼ . The Secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji. This paper does not cover territories in the South Pacific such as the French territories of Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and New Caledonia.
5. Although Niue is often listed as having established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, it has only approached New Zealand to express its interest in doing so. As of 2006, Niue does not have the adequate resources to make this possible. However, its government has established a technical relationship with China and no relationship with Taiwan. Personal communication with the Niue high commissioner in New Zealand, January 11, 2006. special relationship with the region because of proximity and historical linkages, and long-time aid donors like Japan find themselves facing an increasingly strong Chinese presence. This paper examines recent Chinese engagement with the South Pacific, the nature of the regional response to these overtures, and some possible economic, political, and strategic motivations behind China's behavior. The paper concludes with a section contrasting China's increasing activities with the gradual U.S. withdrawal in the region from the early 1990s and considers the implications of rising Chinese influence in the South Pacific for American policy. of 15 small islands and atolls stretches over 850,000 square miles of ocean, it totals only 93 square miles in land area (equal to 1.3 times the size of Washington, D.C.) with a population of 21,000. The mainstays of the economy are tourism, fishing, and a declining agricultural sector. As with many small island nations, the geography, scarcity of land-based natural resources, and shortage of skilled workers mean a heavy dependence on foreign aid, investment, and remittances from Cook Islanders residing overseas. A high cost of living, ongoing political uncertainty, an economic crisis in 1994-96, and damage from natural disasters have had economic implications for the Cooks; many Cook Islanders have migrated abroad.
Despite these uncertainties, the PRC established diplomatic relations with the government of the Cook Islands on July 25, 1997. Since then the bilateral linkages have grown more robust. Just months after the two countries established ties, visiting high-level Chinese officials signed agreements to offer economic assistance to the Islands, and the Chinese Red Cross Society donated $20,000 in hurricane relief. In December 1998, Beijing hosted Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry on a week-long official visit to China, becoming the first prime minister of the Islands to do so. Although Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the EU, and the U.S. remain major economic partners with the region, China's trade and aid contributions have leapfrogged in the past five years from insignificant levels to being among the region's largest. Chinese aid disbursements to Papua New Guinea are now second only to those from Australia. 6 Trade with Tonga, nonexistent in 1998, has grown rapidly, with China becoming the country's second largest export trading partner and fourth largest import partner in 2004. 7 For other South Pacific countries where direction-of-trade statistics are available (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), Chinese trade has dramatically increased since 1999. Beijing is supporting several major infrastructure projects across the region in addition to those in the Cook Islands. These include $2 million for a multipurpose sport facility in Fiji and $5.5 million for a national sports complex in Kiribati. In addition, Beijing plans to upgrade the facilities of Niue's Broadcasting Corporation and fund the rebuilding of Papua New Guinea's Highlands Highway. The Chinese have built a law school at the multi-country University of the South Pacific and a television station and a rice planting project in Vanuatu.
The Chinese government has also made a habit of donating equipment to regional government offices and militaries. In Fiji, Beijing has donated $6,000 toward the improvement of the Foreign Ministry website, $13,000 for two small boats for the fisheries surveillance team, over $250,000 worth of military equipment and stores, and $30,000 of office equipment to the Fijian Parliament. In Papua New Guinea, China has donated at least 50 computers to the Department of Foreign Affairs and over $1 million to the Defense Force to improve its physical training facilities, provide uniforms, and fund the expansion of a military hospital. In Vanuatu, the PRC has funded construction of the National Parliament House, donated eight pick-up trucks to replace the government's aging fleet, and provided two cargo ships worth $9.4 million to facilitate the delivery of goods to isolated island communities.
Assistance in developing the region's natural resources is another area where China has been playing a prominent role. The oceans of the South Pacific are rich in fish stocks, especially tuna. China has established memorandums of understanding (MOU) regarding fishing with the Cook Islands, Fiji, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, and Kiribati (until Kiribati recognized Taiwan). Financial assistance and development projects have also been discussed or awarded to support forestry, agriculture, mineral extraction, tourism, and the power and energy sectors. Both the Fijian and Papuan governments have discussed joint development schemes for timber resources and mining with Chinese officials. Chinese corporations have investigated the feasibility of copper and methanol projects in Papua New Guinea.
In perhaps the largest of China's South Pacific development projects, the China Metallurgical Construction Company (CMCC) signed an MOU on the $625 million Ramu nickel and cobalt mine in Papua New Guinea. In return for an 85% stake, the CMCC will provide complete funding, finish all construction, and buy all of the mine's products for the life of the mine, estimated at 40 years. • provision of Y 3 billion ($374 million) in preferential loans to business communities in China and the South Pacific to boost cooperation in resources development, agriculture, forestry, fishery, tourism, textiles and consumer products manufacturing, telecommunications, and aviation and ocean shipping; • cancellation of debts that became mature at the end of 2005 and extension of zerotariff treatment to the majority of exports to China; • provision of free anti-malaria medicines to island countries affected by the disease in the next three years as well as continuation of sending medical teams to conduct training courses; • provision of training to 2,000 government officials and technical staff from the island countries to assist with capacity building; • extension of ADS to all seven countries diplomatically recognizing China; • provision of assistance in building an earthquake and tsunami early warning system.
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In addition to bilateral efforts, China has been stepping up its relationship with the South Pacific as a whole, particularly through the regional organization called the PIF. In 1988 the Chinese ambassador to Fiji was first invited to the South Pacific Forum, the precursor to the PIF. The following year, China sent its first delegation and from 1990 it has sent a government representative to attend the post-Forum dialogue meetings. Since 1991, the acting secretary-general of the PIF has regularly paid visits to China. On October 31, 2000, China and the PIF signed an agreement under which the Chinese government donated $3 million to the Forum Secretariat to promote trade and investment, $1 million of which would fund the opening and operation of the Pacific Islands Trade Office in Beijing for three years. In 2004, a further $800,000 was provided to cover the PIF Trade Office up until 2008. The PRC has continued to donate thousands of dollars to support the PIF, including $100,000 to upgrade the Forum Secretariat's computer network; a $100,000 annual pledge to supplement membership contributions to the Forum Presiding Officer's Conference (FPOC), which represents the Speakers of Parliament and Congress in the Pacific; and $30,000 to support the FPOC visit to Nauru 11 Workshops for Pacific diplomats and media are conducted in Beijing. In May 2004, China announced its intention to fund major construction projects in Fiji including the building of Pacific House, where the Forum Secretariat offices will be located.
Regional Responses
The Chinese government is not only making major deals throughout the South Pacific; it is also winning friends with its red-carpet diplomacy and interestfree, no-strings-attached, open-ended style of financial support. Such development assistance often comes in the form of grants, not loans. This is much appreciated in an economically vulnerable region where aid is often essential to survival. That China offers an alternative to traditional Pacific partners such as Australia and New Zealand adds to the appeal. After cementing diplomatic ties with the PRC, then-Cook Islands Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry stated, "Gone are the days when the Cook Islands' future is linked solely and overwhelmingly to one country."
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The praise has continued. At the conclusion of the 35th PIF Summit in August 2004, PIF Secretary-General Greg Urwin said the Pacific states welcomed China's growing role in the region and were optimistic about future cooperative exchanges. 13 Following a violent national election in the summer of 2002, Papua New Guinea faced a major political and economic crisis. China was the first country to step forward under the "Friends of PNG" group to donate $1 million to boost the economy. By 2005, China had become Papua New Guinea's top trading partner and the largest buyer of its lumber. In Vanuatu a local paper trumpeted China's "extraordinary generosity and understanding" when covering Deputy Prime Minister Serge Vohor's statement following the receipt of a $300,000 aid check from China. Echoing the opinion of many aiddependent countries, Vohor reportedly said that "similar help from other countries would include sending in their technical advisors so at the end of the day, the money all goes back to them through the huge salaries of their own people. But the Chinese government only provides the money and it is up to the Vanuatu government to decide how it is spent." Yet, despite voices of glowing admiration, the relationship is not all rosy. Some government officials in the region have questioned the reach and aims of China's checkbook diplomacy. In the Cook Islands, there were calls for a boycott of the opening ceremony for the Chinese-built courthouse. A local member of Parliament expressed concerns about China's aid strategy in the Pacific, and a priest raised the issue of the Chinese government's religious persecution at home. 15 A Papuan politician cited worries over plans for China to build an office complex for the Foreign Affairs Department, saying the project touched on national sovereignty and could possibly expose the country to spies. 17 Six months after the election, Kiribati switched its diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. A former Tongan military officer also warned Australia and New Zealand to be aware of China's growing military influence in the Pacific. 18 Illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen has at times been a problem for Pacific islands countries.
One of the greatest problems has been the influx of Chinese migrantslegal or illegal-to the region. 
China's Motivations
Speaking before an audience at the Organization of American States meeting in Washington, D.C., in December 2005, the Chinese vice chairman of the National People's Congress, Cheng Siwei, emphasized China's diplomatic relationship with "95%" of Latin America and the Caribbean "in terms of land area, population, and economic strength." 20 Although this statement is quite accurate, it represents a creative face-saving way to sidestep the fact that one-third of the countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 21 Cheng's message implies nonchalance on Beijing's part toward its diplomatic status with these relatively small developing countries. But this belies China's continuing aggressive attempts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. In the South Pacific, China could make a similar claim, with Australia and New Zealand firmly in China's corner, yet the intense campaign for recognition continues. For China, every country counts, no matter how small.
No doubt those countries that recognize the PRC are rewarded for supporting the one-China policy. By far the largest recipients of aid and attention have been Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu, some of China's longest-standing diplomatic backers. Those countries that recognize Taipei generally receive a cold shoulder from Beijing. A notable exception is the Solomon Islands, which Sino-Taiwan rivalry in the South Pacific is hardly new; competition for diplomatic recognition began in the 1970s. However, diplomatic ties once forged are by no means guaranteed secure. South Pacific governments can be fickle in their support (see Table 1 ). Even long-time supporters Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea have flirted with changing sides. Therefore China has often needed to maintain pressure on its supporters. In 2003 when the Kiribati government indicated its intention to recognize Taiwan, the Chinese ambassador reportedly hounded Kiribati President Anote Tong with so many phone calls that the president was forced to change his telephone number. 23 Although China has been generally disinclined to chastise its supporters beyond using strong political language, Beijing is not beyond using its economic and political leverage to sway countries in the region to remain loyal. In 1999 and 2000, China took advantage of its position on the U.N. Security Council to delay voting on Nauru's and Tuvalu's applications for U.N. membership. 27 As an additional carrot, China pledged an added $100,000 a year for five years in organizational support. The following week the members voted against Taiwan's admission.
At the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, the countries that recognized Taiwan were conspicuously not invited and were excluded from many of the benefits. Premier Wen stated that only those countries recognizing China would be approved as Chinese tourist destinations. Debt relief and zero-tariff status were also only extended to China-friendly countries.
Although eroding Taiwan's diplomatic presence remains a high priority for Beijing, actively advancing relations with Pacific nations is part of a new global approach. China's vigorous diplomacy in the South Pacific over the past several years mirrors its activities in other regions, some in which Taiwan's likelihood of gaining diplomatic recognition figures far less prominently. In his April 2006 speech in Fiji, Wen Jiabao emphasized that China's intentions in cooperating with Pacific Islands countries was not a matter of "diplomatic expediency, rather, it is a strategic decision." 28 There are issues beyond Taiwan where China seeks backing from supporters in the region. In international organizations with a "one-country, one-vote" policy such as the United Nations, a region of small-nation supporters can be influential. With the exception of the Cook Islands and Niue (whose external affairs are handled by New Zealand), all the countries in the region are members of the U.N. For several, including Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu, China has had a hand in securing their membership. In China is resource hungry; its economic growth is fueling a considerable appetite for natural resources. The need to secure supply and access is driving Beijing's foreign policy around the globe. Although South Pacific nations are not particularly resource rich, they do have some that Beijing finds attractiveminerals, hydrocarbons, timber, gold, and vast areas of ocean for fishing. Part of the problem for these countries is that they are too underdeveloped to harvest the resources themselves. Therefore, when China proposes such projects it is often seen as a win-win for China and the Pacific nation. In many of the fishing agreements, China has provided the funds for boats, processing plants, and facilities, even constructing them, in exchange for fishing rights for Chinese boats in regional exclusive economic zones (EEZ). A percentage of the profits earned and a portion of the catch are to be exported to China. The Papua New Guinea Ramu nickel and cobalt mine is another such win-win project. China is a major user of nickel to produce steel alloys. With the world supply of nickel declining, the mine provides one way for China to secure a source of nickel for decades to come.
In tandem with rising resource consumption, disposable incomes in China are also climbing. This translates to greater population mobility and a desire to travel abroad. A report on Chinese tourism trends indicates that by the year 2020 China will become the world's largest source of outbound touristsaround 115 million annually. 30 The Asia Pacific region is the fastest growing tourist area in the world. Although Hong Kong and Macao remain the top "foreign" destinations for Chinese tourists, followed by countries in Southeast Asia, tourism to the South Pacific may be attractive both to tourists and the Chinese government. The number one travel consideration for Chinese tourists is safety. Following the tsunami in South and Southeast Asia in December 2004, Chinese travel to Southeast Asia dropped considerably. The threat of terrorist activity or a severe outbreak of Avian flu akin to the rapid spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 also make Southeast Asia a less attractive option for the Chinese. Several destinations in the South Pacific offer relatively safe and clean alternatives. We can see from China's recent heavy involvement in the regional tourism organization, its conferrals of ADS (including most recently to Tahiti), 31 and its efforts to explore direct flights or to support small national airlines, it is clear that the South Pacific is on Beijing's travel radar. China looks poised to surpass the region's top inbound tourist markets of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Within five years of granting ADS to Australia, Chinese tourists had become the largest growing inbound market, outnumbering Japanese tourists, with similar trends being seen in Guam and the Northern Marianas. 32 Since 1999 the number of U.S. tourists to Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu has fallen.
Over the long term, the South Pacific may also serve as an important strategic asset to China. In 1997 China established a satellite tracking station on South Tarawa Atoll in Kiribati. One of three overseas China Space and Telemetry Stations run by the Chinese military, the strategically located Tarawa facility was instrumental in China's first manned space flight in October 2003. However, there were also accusations that the base was being used to spy on the U.S. Army's Kwajalein Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands, a center of operations for the development of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense system approximately 600 miles from Tarawa. With Kiribati's diplomatic defection to Taiwan in November 2003, a disgruntled China announced that the satellite station would be dismantled. A Chinese official noted that China could find another place to build a similar base or could send monitoring ships to the region. 33 Another Chinese goal may be to challenge American predominance by weakening U.S. alliances in the region. By politically and economically strengthening its partnerships in the South Pacific, Beijing may be able to build its own strategic alliances in the long term. The PRC maintains bilateral military ties with those Pacific Island countries with defense forces. Although the arrangement is primarily limited to providing equipment, training, and logistical support, there exists the potential for increased exchanges. Chinese involvement in improving infrastructure such as airports, bridges, and highways, as well as seeking agreements to allow Chinese ships in Pacific EEZs, may have strategic implications in the future. was instead facing "decreasing leverage," in large part because of growing East Asian competition in trade, aid, investment, tourism, education, research, and political influence, all in the context of a shifting global security environment. 34 More than a decade on, the Chinese have made considerable progress in all of these areas. In fact, by coordinating its economic assistance with a sophisticated strategy for diplomacy, Beijing is engaging the region in other ways, from boosting familiarity with Chinese goods and services, broadcasting Chinese television programing, expanding student exchanges, increasing business ties, encouraging the study of Mandarin, and paving the way for an increase in Chinese tourism. Such activities can be seen as helping to enhance "soft power," the ability of a country to influence other nations via its culture, values, and institutions. Such power, as opposed to hard power drawn from military or economic prowess, is derived from sources as diverse as a country's willingness to cooperate multilaterally, through its television and film, commercial goods, and people. 35 In the face of what many countries see as U.S. moves toward unilateralism and a preoccupation with counterterrorism and Iraq, U.S. soft power, once a strength of its foreign policy, is considered by some to be in decline. 36 Some of the greatest sources of U.S. soft power come from interaction with its people, aid, and development programs. However, over the past decade the U.S. has curtailed many programs that offer such exchanges with the South Pacific. In July 1993, the U.S. closed its embassy in Honiara, the capital of the Solomons, reducing its regional diplomatic posts to four, in Fiji, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Papua New Guinea. 37 Washington reopened a "virtual" embassy in the Solomon Islands in May 2005 (the first of its kind) and another in Vanuatu that July. 38 Although they are a potential new diplomatic model that recognizes the reality both of limited resources and of technological advances, a virtual embassy lacks the tangible demonstration of U.S. interests that public outreach programing and actual personnel from a physical embassy provide. 39 Although in the past few years there has been a resurgence in volunteer numbers, those countries still hosting Peace Corps missions have, for the most part, seen fewer volunteers than in previous decades. The U.S. also closed its United States Information Agency offices in the region during the early to mid-90s. As a result, the two-way Fulbright student scholarship program with South Pacific countries ended. Beijing, on the other hand, has been opening cultural centers, promoting the study of Chinese, and increasing funding for students from the Pacific Islands to study in China.
In 1994 the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Regional Development Office for the South Pacific located in Suva, Fiji (with a branch office in Port Moresby), also closed. Although the regional development office covered 10 countries, five million people, and a geographic area larger than the U.S., at $12 million annually it was considered too expensive to maintain. 40 The office transferred its remaining projects to the USAID office in the Philippines. For the most part, Chinese overtures have been welcomed in the region. In contrast, the pullout of Western interests has been met with apprehension, even a sense of abandonment. According to the Close-Out Summary Report when the USAID Regional Development Office closed in the mid-1990s, countries in the region expressed concern that the U.S. government was "turning its back on the region." The recent closure of three U.K. embassies and its withdrawal from the regional development body, the Pacific Community, evoked a similar response. 42 Although Admiral Thomas Fargo, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, visited Tonga and Fiji in March 2004, it was primarily to reaffirm U.S. bilateral military ties and seek support for the U.S. global war on terrorism and efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such bilateral ties are important; however, the U.S. needs to communicate to the region that it cares about goals beyond fighting terrorism, such as supporting democracy, human security, environmental conservation, disaster management, development, and fair trade. South Pacific countries do not want to choose between the U.S. (or the U.K. or Australia) and China. They want a range of options, not an exchange of one dominant partner for another. Despite assurances to the contrary, the message being conveyed is that China is paying attention to the region and the U.S. is not.
The rise of Chinese activities in the region is not sufficient justification for an increased U.S. effort in the South Pacific, but recognition of American economic, strategic, and political interests is reason to make such an effort. U.S. interests may be modest but are not unimportant. Total trade between the U.S. and the countries of Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu was $406 million in 2004. U.S. commercial fishing interests are strong. The South Pacific produces more than half of the world's annual tuna catch. As party to the Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, U.S. fleets land between $250 million and $400 million worth of fish stocks annually, after processing and distribution. 43 Strategically, the U.S. maintains the Kwajalein Missile Range, the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, and two satellite tracking stations on the Johnston and Kwajalein Atolls in the Marshall Islands. At certain times and on certain issues, South Pacific nation support in international forums like the United Nations and for U.S. initiatives is also important. Between June and December 2004, Tonga provided a unit of 45 troops as part of the U.S. coalition in Iraq. The U.S. also has broad global interests in promoting democracy, human rights, and economic development. These are at risk in the region, as demonstrated by coups in the Solomon Islands and Fiji as well as political instability and economic vulnerability in other South Pacific nations.
Modest but important American interests require only modest investment, but the U.S. is moving in the wrong direction. As a result, although Washington's involvement in the region has not disappeared, it is being eclipsed by Beijing's rising influence. However, it is not too late for the U.S. to reverse these trends. Chinese aid and investment in the South Pacific has so far been fairly small in absolute terms and Beijing's "no-strings" approach is not aimed at supporting democratic institutions, human rights, or sustainable development. On the other hand, U.S. programs such as USAID, the Peace Corps, and the Fulbright student exchange contribute lasting benefits in the countries where they operate. For example, the Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP), one of only two research institutes in the U.S. dedicated solely to South Pacific studies, administers the United States-South Pacific Scholarship Program, the United Nations Governance Project, and the Fiji Futures Project and serves as the Secretariat for the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders and the United States/Pacific Islands Joint Commercial Commission. Such programs should be supported and expanded: these relatively small investments in scholarships and public diplomacy initiatives positively promote long-term development in U.S.-South Pacific relations. The U.S. government can also work more proactively with its allies in the region-Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the U.K., France, and Singapore-not to contain China but to promote good governance and strong economies in Pacific Island nations. However, should the United States continue to remain passive in the face of a growing Chinese presence, China may not only woo the South Pacific but possibly win it.
